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ISBN  3–86558–005–XAbstract:
This paper attempts to identify and evaluate the main determinants of venture capital
(VC). We develop a theoretical model where macroeconomic conditions, technological
opportunity, and the entrepreneurial environment affect the demand and supply of VC.
The quantitative results, based on a panel dataset of 16 OECD countries from 1990 to
2000, show that VC intensity is pro-cyclical. Interest rates affect more the demand side
of VC (entrepreneurs) than the supply side. Indicators of technological opportunity,
such as the stock of knowledge and the number of triadic patents affect positively and
significantly the relative level of VC. Labour market rigidities reduce the impact of the
GDP growth rate and of the stock of knowledge, whereas a minimum level of
entrepreneurship is required in order to have a positive effect of the available stock of
knowledge on VC intensity.
Keywords: Venture Capital, Technological Opportuniy, Entrepreneurship,
Labour Market Regidities
JEL-Classification: G24, O33, M13, C33Non Technical Summary
The objective of this paper is to identify the main determinants of venture capital (VC).
We develop a theoretical model where three main types of factors affect the demand and
supply of VC: macroeconomic conditions, technological opportunity, and the
entrepreneurial environment. The model is evaluated with a panel dataset of 16 OECD
countries over the period 1990-2000. The results show that VC intensity is pro-cyclical.
Short-term and long-term interest rates have a positive impact on VC intensity, which
means that they affect more entrepreneurs than the supply of VC. Indicators of
technological opportunity, such as the stock of knowledge and the number of triadic
patents affect positively and significantly the relative level of VC. Labour market
rigidities reduce the impact of the GDP growth rate and of the stock of knowledge,
whereas a minimum level of entrepreneurship is required in order to have a positive
effect of the available stock of knowledge on VC intensity.Nicht-technische Zusammenfassung
Ziel des Diskussionspapiers ist die Bestimmung der wichtigsten Einflussfaktoren des
Wagniskapitals. Wir entwickeln ein theoretisches Modell, bei dem die Nachfrage nach
Wagniskapital und das Angebot an Wagniskapital im Wesentlichen durch drei Faktoren
beeinflusst werden: die gesamtwirtschaftlichen Bedingungen, die technologischen
Möglichkeiten und das unternehmerische Umfeld. Evaluiert wird das Modell anhand
einer Reihe von Paneldaten aus 16 OECD-Ländern für den Zeitraum von 1990 bis 2000.
Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass die Wagniskapitalintensität prozyklisch ist. Kurz- und
Langfristzinsen haben eine positive Wirkung auf die Wagniskapitalintensität. Dies
bedeutet, dass sie die Unternehmer stärker als die Verfügbarkeit von Wagniskapital
beeinflussen. Indikatoren der technologischen Möglichkeiten wie der Wissensbestand
und die Anzahl triadischer Patente wirken sich positiv und signifikant auf das relative
Niveau des Wagniskapitals aus. Rigiditäten am Arbeitsmarkt vermindern den Einfluss
der BIP-Wachstumsrate und des Wissensbestands, während ein Mindestmaß an
Unternehmergeist erforderlich ist, damit der verfügbare Wissensbestand einen positiven
Effekt auf die Wagniskapitalintensität hat.Contents
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Venture capital (VC) is a financial intermediary that aims at fitting innovative start-up’s
needs, mainly because these firms are generally associated with large growth potentials
and high levels of uncertainty. A growing number of scholars have documented the
positive impact that venture funds have on the probability of success of start-ups, as
well as on the growth of their sales and employees
1. Most government bodies in
industrialized countries now recognize the importance of VC as a factor of firm creation
and sustainable growth. Access to finance is seen as a key factor in the process of
R&D’s translation into commercial outcomes. VC, as a specific type of finance for
high-risk projects, has an important role to play in this translation. (OECD, 1996)
Despite this wide recognition of venture funds as key players underlying a
country’s entrepreneurial performances, there are huge differences across industrialized
countries in the relative amounts invested in VC. VC intensity is relatively high in the
USA and Canada for instance, whereas it is very low in Japan. The diversity of national
financial systems is undoubtedly one important factor underlying these international
differences. Black and Gilson (1998) find a linkage between countries’ financial system
and VC market. Active stock market is more appropriate to strong venture capital
market than bank market because of the potential for VC exit through an IPO. An active
VC market requires a liquid stock market.
Other factors also play an important role, as shown by Gompers and Lerner
(1998), Jeng and Wells (2000) and Sherlter (2003). With a panel dataset of 21 countries
Jeng and Wells show that labour market rigidities, the level of Initial Public Offerings
                                                
*  Astrid Romain has a research grant provided by the Région de Bruxelles-Capitale. We would like to
thank Wolfgang Bessler (Justus-Liebig_University Giessen), Lydia Greunz (ULB, DULBEA), Pierre
Mohnen (MERIT) and Reinhilde Veugelers (KUL) for their useful comments. The participants to
academic seminars organized at KUL in November 2002, at MERIT in January 2003, at the Institute of
Innovation Research (IIR) of the Hitotsubashi University in July 2003, at Eltville for the 6
th
Bundesbank Spring Conference “Financing Innovation” 2004 also provided insightful suggestions. An
earlier version of this paper has been published as a Working Paper of the IIR: WP#03-25.
1 See Engel (2002), Hellmann and Puri (2002), Kortum and Lerner (2000), Romain and van
Pottelsberghe (2003) for empirical evidence on the economic impact of VC.2
(IPO), government programs for entrepreneurship, and bankruptcy procedures explain a
significant share of cross country variations in VC intensity.
The objective of this paper is to contribute to this recent stream of research in
three ways. We first develop a theoretical model which takes into account the factors
that affect the demand and supply of VC. These factors include the growth of GDP,
short-term and long-term interest rates, several indicators of technological opportunity,
and of entrepreneurial environment. Second, we exploit a panel dataset composed of 16
countries over an eleven years period. Third, we investigate to what extent the level of
entrepreneurship and of labour market rigidities affect the impact of the GDP growth
rate and the stock of available knowledge on VC intensity.
The results show that interest rates significantly influence VC intensity. The
countries with lower labour market rigidities benefit from a higher impact of the GDP
growth rate and the available stock of knowledge on the relative level of VC. Higher
levels of entrepreneurship – i.e., the percentage of people being involved in the creation
of nascent firms – induce a positive and significant relation between the R&D capital
stock and VC intensity.
The paper is structured as follows: The next section summarizes the main findings
of the few existing evaluation of the determinants of VC. A theoretical model of
demand and supply of VC and the econometric model are developed in section 3. The
empirical results are presented and interpreted in section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 Literature review
Some articles have so far focused on the determinants of VC performance (Hege et al.
2003; Manigart et al. 2002). Hege et al. (2003) present a rigorous comparative study of
the determinants of performance between the European VC industry and the US VC
industry. They show that the US VCs perform better than the European ones under the
two performance measures: type of exit and internal rate return of the financed project.
There are several differences in the US and the EU behaviour. The use of convertibles
and replacement of the entrepreneur as the syndication are more frequent in the US.
Hege et al. suggest that either US venture capitalists are more sophisticated than their
European counterparts, or the network effects are very important.3
In the US, the origin of funds is not the same as in the EU. It has been widely
accepted in the literature that VC investments in the US have been positively influenced
by the clarification of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) “prudent
man” rule of 1979. As a result pension funds started to invest substantial amounts of
money into VC funds. In 1978 pension funds accounted for 15% of VC funds in the US
and in the middle of the 80’s, the share had risen to more than 50 %.
Behaviors may not be the only factor of differences between US and EU. The
definition of VC may also have an impact on the performance analysis. Indeed, the
European Venture Capital Association included management buy-outs (MBOs) and
management buy-ins (MBIs) in the definition of the VC. In that matter, we decided to
include in venture expenditures only seed, start-up and early stage capital and not
replacement capital and buyout. By this way, we obtain the same definition of VC for
each country.
To the best of our knowledge, however, only a few articles attempted to evaluate
quantitatively the macroeconomic determinants of VC. Jeng and Wells (2000) develop a
model aiming at identifying the determinants of VC and test it on a cross-section of 21
countries over a period of 10 years. Gompers and Lerner (1998) focus on the US
economy over the period 1969-1994. Schertler (2003) analyses the driving forces of VC
activity with data from 14 Western European countries for the time period 1988 to










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































According to Black and Gilson (1998), active stock market is important for strong
venture capital market because of the potential for VC exit through an Initial Public
Offering. IPO is considered as being a very important determinant of VC. It is the
strongest driver of VC according to Jeng and Wells (2000) because it reflects the
potential return to VC funds. Gompers and Lerner (1998) take it as a proxy for fund
performance but cannot find any significant effect in their multivariate regressions. It
seems that the IPO variable is strongly correlated with the expected return on alternative
investments and with the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), which is also a proxy for exit
opportunities. GDP and Market Capitalization Growth (MCG) are part of the impact of
IPOs and therefore turn out to be not significant for Jeng and Wells (2000). However
the reverse is true for Gompers and Lerner who find a positive and significant impact of
Equity Market Return and GDP on VC but no impact of IPO. Higher GDP growth
implies higher attractive opportunities for entrepreneurs, which lead to a higher need for
venture funds. Schertler (2003) uses either the capitalisation of stock markets or the
number of firms listed as measure of the liquidity of stock markets. He finds that
liquidity of stock market has a significant positive impact on VC investments at early
stages. However, as Jeng and Wells (2000), he finds that the growth rate of the stock
market capitalisation does not have significant impact on VC investments at early
stages.
For Jeng and Wells (2000), getting the basic legal and tax structures into place
appears to be an important factor influencing VC. Gompers and Lerner (1998) also
recognize the importance of government decisions on the private equity funds. The
labour market legislation is typically put in place to protect employees from arbitrary,
unfair or discriminatory actions by employers. Some authors argue that venture
financing can suffer from the rigidity of the labour market in Europe (e.g. Ramón and
Marti, 2001). Jeng and Wells (2000) show that it does not significantly influence total
VC but affects negatively the early stage of VC investment. According to Shertler
(2003), labour market rigidities are significant and positive. That can be the result of
differences in the labour-capital ratio of high-technology enterprises. He also argues that
high-technology enterprises operating in rigid labour markets may demand more capital
than comparable high-technology enterprises operating in flexible labour markets.6
With the clarification of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)
“prudent man” rule of 1979, the share of money invested by pension funds had risen to
more than 50 %. Jeng and Wells (2000) find that the level of investment by private
pension funds in VC is a significant determinant of VC over time but not across
countries. Gompers and Lerner (1998) use a proxy for the amendment of the “prudent
man” rule to show the impact of pension regulation and reach a similar conclusion.
After 1979, the additional capital provided by pension funds led to a dramatic shift in
commitments to VC.
Concerning the impact of the Capital Gains Tax Rate (CGTR) on VC activity,
Gompers and Lerner (1998) show that a decrease in CGTR has a positive and important
impact on commitment to new VC funds. In fact, they confirm the result of Poterba
(1989) who built a model of decision to become an entrepreneur. He found that
decreases in CGTR might increase the raising of VC funds not through stimulation of
the supply side (i.e., the potential fund providers) but rather on the demand side. Indeed,
decreases in CGTR often encourage entrepreneurship and thus the desire of people to
create their own firm and to engage in R&D activities. Anand (1996) also highlights the
fact that the level and composition of investments appear to be negatively affected by
increases in the CGTR but investments in one industry may be affected by myriad of
other factors like technology shifts, tastes, etc.
Both industrial and academic R&D expenditures are significantly related to
venture capital activity at the State level in the model of Gompers and Lerner (1998).
For them, the growth VC fundraising in the mid-1990s may be due to increases in
technological opportunities. Shertler (2003) tests the number of employees in research
and development and the number of patents as the approximation of the human capital
endowment. He finds a positive impact of the number of R&D employees. Also, he
highlights that the coefficients of the patent variable are positive and highly significant.
However, there is a misspecification in the model due to the low number of
observations because patent data are not available for 1999 and 2000.
Interest rates might also be an important factor influencing VC. Although Jeng
and Wells (2000) do not take this factor into account into their cross country
investigation, Gompers and Lerner (1998) show that it affects positively the demand for7
VC funds in the US. Economic theory would suggest a reverse relationship: if interest
rates rise, the level of investment should fall. The positive impact estimated by Gompers
and Lerner is probably due to the fact that they use a short-term interest rate. If short-
term interest rates increase, the attractiveness of venture financing versus credit through
usual financial institutions increases from the entrepreneur’s viewpoint.
Concerning government programs for entrepreneurship, a main rationale of direct
government intervention in the VC industry is the stimulation of economic growth.
Manigart and Beuselinck (2001) find some evidence that a good economic climate, high
stock market returns and a high number of IPO would lead to a lower supply of
government funds to the VC industry.
Some scholars have also focused on the micro determinants of VC. For Gompers
and Lerner (1998) the individual firm performance and reputation, measured with the
firm age and size, positively impact the capacity to raise larger funds. Hellmann and
Puri (2000) use a probit model to show that the strategy of a company is one of the
determinants of VC investment when controlling for the age of the company and its
industrial sector. If the strategy is an innovative one (the company is the first to
introduce a new product or service on the market), it has a higher probability to benefit
from VC compared to companies that follow an imitation strategy (the company uses
existing technologies to develop and improve products and processes). They also find
that innovating companies are able to raise VC earlier in their life cycle than companies
with a strategy of imitation. In other words, their analysis suggests that VC is stimulated
by technological opportunities. However there is less evidence of such a relationship at
the aggregate macroeconomic level.
In a nutshell, there are several potential determinants of VC. Some of them can be
measured qualitatively or quantitatively at the macro level whereas others like the fund
reputation and the strategy of the venture funded firms are microeconomic factors. In
the next section we develop a theoretical model that takes into account the various
macroeconomic factors that might affect the demand and supply of VC.8
3 Modelling the amount of Venture Capital
As Poterba (1989) and Gompers and Lerner (1998), we argue that changes in the level
of VC funds come from changes either in the supply or the demand of VC. The demand
comes from the entrepreneurs interested in setting up an innovative start-up. The supply
of VC corresponds to the share of risk capital provided by private investors, pension
funds and banks. The actual amount of VC invested represents the equilibrium between
the demand and the supply of VC.
The demand and supply of VC can be modelled through equations (1) and (2) that
characterize the demand price of VC, P
d, and the supply price of VC, P
s, respectively.
The supply price of VC is assumed to be a positive function of the available VC funds,
the interest rate (r) and the corporate tax rate (TAX). The more VC is available on the
market, the higher will be the supply price of VC, due to increasing marginal costs
(avc>0). If interest rates increase we can expect the fund providers to increase their
return requirement (ar>0; otherwise they would opt for alternative investments
opportunities). Similarly, an increase in the corporate income tax rate would increase
the return requirements (atax>0).
r a TAX a VC a a P r tax vc C VC
s + + + = (1)
r b TAX b EN b TO b Y ˆ b VC b b P r tax en to Y ˆ vc C VC
d + + + + + + = (2)
The equation of the demand price of VC reflects the entrepreneurs’ viewpoint.
Decreasing marginal returns to VC is assumed (the projects with the largest expected
returns are selected first). The more VC is available the lower is the demand price of
VC (bvc<0). The other factors that are assumed to influence the demand of VC are the
GDP growth (Y), technological opportunities (TO), entrepreneurial culture (EN), the
level of corporate income tax rate (TAX) and interest rates (r). The countries with a high
GDP growth, large technological opportunities and a strong entrepreneurial culture are
more likely to be associated with a strong demand for VC (and hence positive effects on
the demand price of VC: bY>0; bTO>0; bEN>0). The general level of taxation will9
probably reduce the rate of entrepreneurship (the demand for VC and therefore btax<0).
Concerning interest rates, we consider that innovative start-up’s need important
amounts of money in the short-term. Therefore if the cost of capital increases
entrepreneurs are more likely to switch from the banking sector to the venture fund
providers (br>0).
Equations (3) and (4) show the equilibrium level of VC that equalizes the supply
and demand of VC.
r ) a b ( TAX ) a b (
EN b TO b Y ˆ b ) a b ( VC ) b a (
r r it tax tax
en to Y ˆ C C vc vc
− + − +
+ + + − = −
(3)
increasing marginal cost of VC Investment
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Since the denominator is always positive, the numerator provides the expected
sign of the parameters between brackets. All the right-hand side variables, except the
level of taxation and the interest rate, are expected to have a positive impact on VC. For
the interest rate (r), the impact is either negative or positive depending on the difference
between the demand price effect and the supply price effect. If the demand price effect
of a high interest rate is larger than its supply price effect, then the overall impact of
interest rates on VC should be positive. The effect of the level of corporate income tax
rate on the equilibrium level of VC will always be negative since (btax – atax) is always
negative.
The empirical implementation of equation (4) is presented in equations (5) and
(6). The growth rate of GDP allows testing the cyclicality of VC. Regarding interest rate
we suspect that short-term and long-term interest rates could affect differently the


















short-term interest rate (one year, r
ST), a long-term interest rate (ten years, r
LT) and the
spread (difference between short-term and long-term) in the empirical model.
Technological opportunity is proxied by three variables, the growth rate of business
R&D outlays, the business R&D capital stock and the number of triadic patents
2. The
growth rate of business R&D expenditures represents the research dynamics of a
country. The business R&D capital stock is an indicator of the available stock of
knowledge (or of the cumulated innovative efforts). The number of triadic patents is an
indicator of innovative output. It measures the number of highly valuable inventions
invented in each country (it is counted by country of inventor and by priority year).
The entrepreneurial environment can be measured with three variables: the level
of taxation, the level of entrepreneurial activity and labour market rigidities. Further
variables like shareholder rights, legal protection, accounting standards could be
included, but due to non-availability of the data, we could not test these variables. The
level of taxation is measured with the corporate income tax rate (CITR). The measures
of entrepreneurial activity (TEA) and labour market rigidity (RIG) are indices that are
available for one year in our database. We therefore introduce them in interaction with
other variables. For instance, we test whether RIG would affect the impact of GDP
growth rate on the intensity of VC. This is equivalent to test whether the impact of GDP
growth rate on VC intensity is composed of a fixed component (β
c
∆ gdp) and a
component that varies across countries according to the level of labour market rigidities
(i.e., β ∆ gdp= β
c
∆ gdp + β rig ∆  GDP). Similarly, labour market rigidity (RIG) and the level
of entrepreneurship (TEA) might affect the impact of the available stock of knowledge,
SBRD, on VC. These interactions are illustrated in equation (6).
Model with no interaction
it t i G it citr
2 it pat 1 it sbrd 1 it brd it r it gdp it
G CITR
LPAT SBRD BRD r GDP VC
µ ϕ φ σ β
β β ∆ β β ∆ β ∆ ∆
+ + + + +
+ + + + =
− − − (5)
                                                
2  The objective of this paper is not to provide evidence on the causality issue between VC and
technological opportunities. We know that there is interaction between these variables but here we
would like to test the impact of the growth rate of business R&D outlays, the business R&D capital
stock and the number of triadic patents on VC intensity.11
Model with interactions with TEA and RIG
it t i
G i 1 it tea i it rig
it citr 1 it sbrd it r it gdp it
G ) TEA * SBRD ( ) RIG * GDP (
CITR SBRD r GDP VC
µ ϕ φ
σ β ∆ β







where ∆  represents the first logarithmic difference and L the natural logarithm. In
this equation, the parameters that are to be estimated are assumed to be constant across
countries and over time; they are defined as follows (the expected signs are presented
between parentheses):
β ∆ gdp The impact of GDP growth (+).
β r The impact of interest rate (?).
β ∆ brd The impact of business R&D expenditures growth rate (+).
β sbrd The impact of the level of business R&D capital stock (+).
β pat The impact of the number of triadic patents (+).
β rig The impact of labour market rigidities on β ∆ gdp (-) or on β sbrd (-).
β tea The impact of the level of entrepreneurship on β sbrd (+).
β citr The impact of the CITR (-).
A range of control variables is included in all the regressions.
G is a dummy equal to 1 for Germany in 1991, and 0 otherwise; in order to take into
account the exogenous shock of the German unification.
φ i are country dummies which take into account country-specific framework
conditions that might affect VC intensity.
ϕ t are time dummies which take into account exogenous shocks that are common to
several countries, such as changes in exchange rates.12
The variables (for country i and time t) are defined as follows:
VC is the venture capital intensity, i.e. the VC funds divided by GDP (Sources:
EVCA and OECD)
3.
GDP is the gross domestic product (Source: OECD, Main Science and Technology
Indicators).
r is the one-year national deposit interest rate (Source: IMF) or the long-term
national interest rate (10 years, Source: OECD).
BRD is the business R&D expenditures (Source: OECD, Main Science and
Technology Indicators).
SBRD is the business R&D capital stock. It has been computed using the perpetual
inventory method from total intramural business R&D expenditures, in constant
1990 GDP prices and US PPPs (see appendix 1). The depreciation rate is 15%.
Sensitivity analysis show that the results of the regressions do not change
significantly with the chosen depreciation rate (Guellec and van Pottelsberghe,
2001 and 2004) (Source: OECD Main Science and Technology Indicators).
PAT is the number of Triadic patents. These patents have been applied at the USPTO,
the Japanese Patent Office and the European Patent Office. We can therefore
assume that they reflect patents with a very high value (Source: OECD, Main
Science and Technology Indicators).
RIG is the employment protection index drawn up by the OECD (1994a) and based
on the strength of the legal framework governing hiring and firing of employees.
It is a measure of labour market rigidities. The countries are ranked from 1 to 20
with 20 being the most strictly regulated. Since the indicator is fixed over time,
it is introduced in interaction with GDP and SBRD.
TEA is the Total Entrepreneurship Activity (TEA)-index computed by adding the
proportion of adults involved in the creation of nascent firms and the proportion
involved in new firms (Source: The Global Entrepreneurship Monitor 2001).
The variable is a ranking from 1 to 20. This measure of entrepreneurial activity
                                                
3  In this paper, in order to have the same definition of VC for each country, venture expenditures include
only seed, start-up and early stage capital and do not include replacement capital and buyout.13
can be meaningfully used for international comparisons. Since the indicator is
fixed over time, it is introduced in interaction with SBRD.
CITR is the corporate income tax rate (Source: OTPR - Office of Tax Policy
Research).
The estimates are performed with a panel data set of 16 OECD countries over the
period 1990-2000
4. These 16 countries are Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain,
Sweden, United Kingdom and United States. The period can vary across countries based
on availability of information. Descriptive statistics of all the variables are presented in
Table 2. The average value of the dependent variable (VC intensity) varies from 0.02
percent in Denmark and Japan, to 0.18 percent in Canada, as shown in the last column.
                                                
4  The time period examined could be biased by an extraordinary environment (i.e. Stock market bubble
in the late 90s, declining interest rate level). Theoretically, we would have control for this bias by



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Each variable of equation (5) has first been included separately in the empirical model.
The estimated parameters are presented in Table 3. All variables have the expected
impact as far as their sign and significance are concerned. Results concerning the
growth rate of GDP (Table 3, column 1) are in line with those of Gompers and Lerner
(1998) for the USA but do not confirm the non-significant impact obtained by Jeng and
Wells (2000). Several tests have been carried out in order to determine whether a time
lag is necessary. However, only the contemporaneous GDP growth rate has a significant
impact on VC intensity.
Both one-year and ten-year interest rates have a positive and significant impact,
suggesting that the demand effect of interest rates is stronger than the supply-side effect.
Since entrepreneurs must have a shorter vision of financial constraints (or return) than
fund providers, we would have expected a negative impact of the long-term interest
rate. It is worth mentioning that the adjusted R-squared is the smallest with the ten-year
interest rate. Column 4 of Table 3 reports the impact of the difference between the long-
term and short-term interest rates (spread). The negative and significant impact suggests
a stronger supply-side effect. What matters is not only the level of the long-term interest
rate but also the difference between the long-term and short-term rates. The larger this
difference, the less venture fund providers would be attracted towards risky investment.
In the 90s the level of interest rates decreased in most countries, but VC market
boomed. It may be perhaps explained by a statistically significant negative relationship.
To ensure that the results are robust over the business cycle and thus control this bias,
we need to test our regressions on a longer period (e.g. 20 years). Unfortunately, we
could not proceed to this exercise because of the non-availability of data.
The three variables representing technological opportunity and research efforts
play a significant role in determining VC intensity. The strong and positive impact of
the growth rate of business R&D expenditures, the business R&D capital stock and the
number of triadic patents show that the demand of VC is sensitive to the dynamics of
research activities, to the available stock of knowledge and to the level of innovation







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The two variables that yield the highest adjusted R-squared are the short-term
interest rate, the difference between the long-term and short-term interest rates. Then
come the GDP growth rate and the technological opportunity variables. The short-term
cost of money and technological opportunity seem to be the strongest drivers of VC.
The adjusted R-squared is the smallest with the long-term interest rate. Corporate
income tax rate has no impact on the VC intensity.
Table 4 presents the results of the estimates with several variables introduced
simultaneously in the model
5. The sign and significance of the impact of all these
variables remain unchanged when they are introduced simultaneously in the model
except for the business R&D investment growth rate.
Columns 1 to 3 present the basic model described in equation (5), with different
indicators for the interest rates. The GDP growth in column 1 is still significant,
whereas in column 2, it is less significant, probably due to the simultaneous introduction
of the long-term interest rate in the model. The difference between short-term and long-
                                                
5  The Durbin-Watson statistic is used to test the presence of autocorrelation in the residuals of our
regression equations. The formula for the statistic where d = Durbin-Watson Statistic, e = residual and






















The 5% critical value for the true distribution of d
must lie to the right of the critical value of  l d  and to the left of critical value of  u d . Therefore, the
test that may be carried out is: We do not reject  0 H  if  u d d > . We reject  0 H  if  l d d < . No
conclusion is drawn if  u l d d d ≤ ≤ .
In this paper, we can imagine that there is autocorrelation but our data are included in the Durbin and














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































term interest rates has a significant and negative impact (column 3). It seems therefore
that the short-term and long-term cost of capital and their difference play an important
role in explaining the intensity of VC. These results witness a stronger influence of the
cost of capital on the demand side (entrepreneurs) than on the supply side (investors).
However, the larger the difference between long-term and short-term interest rates, the
lower the VC intensity, suggesting a stronger influence of the spread on the supply-side
of VC.
The parameters associated with the business R&D capital stock and the number of
triadic patents are positive and significant. This result about triadic patents is consistent
with the results of Kortum and Lerner (1998) or Tykvova (2000) who show that a surge
of patents may increase the VC fundraising. In other words, the property of highly
valued intellectual assets (triadic patents are associated with a much higher value than
the patents applied only in one country or region) seems to stimulate the demand for
VC.
The remaining columns test other specifications described in equation (6), with
two interaction variables representing a country’s entrepreneurial environment. The
index of labour market rigidities is first interacted with the GDP growth rate variable
(see column 5). The results suggest that the impact of GDP growth rate on the VC
intensity is composed of a fixed and significant component (0.0092) and a country
specific component that depends on labour market rigidities (-0.00057). The positive
impact of GDP on the VC intensity is therefore reduced in countries with high labour
market rigidities. Jeng and Wells (2000) obtain a similar result but only for early stage
funding. Over the threshold of 16.1 in the index of labour market rigidities, the impact
of GDP growth becomes negative. Column 6 presents the estimated parameters related
to the interaction between labour market rigidities and the stock of business R&D.
Again, we find a negative and significant impact of the interaction term.
The level of entrepreneurship is interacted in a similar way with the stock of
available knowledge (the R&D capital stock, in column 7). Estimates indicate that the
impact of the R&D capital stock on the VC intensity is composed of a fixed negative
component and a country specific component that depends on the relative level of
entrepreneurship (TEA): the higher the level of entrepreneurship, the stronger the20
impact of the business R&D capital stock on VC intensity. In order to have a positive
impact of the available stock of knowledge on VC performances, a minimum level of
entrepreneurship is required. The estimated parameters suggest that the impact of the
business R&D capital stock on the VC intensity becomes positive and significant above
a threshold of 8.4 in the TEA index (level of entrepreneurship).
The estimated parameters associated with the interaction between the two
country-specific variables representing the entrepreneurial environment are stable.
Column 8 shows that the simultaneous introduction of the two indicators (RIG and
TEA) yields jointly significant parameters. Figure 1 illustrates the results of the
estimates presented in table 4 (column 5 and 6). It shows how the level of labour market
rigidities affects the impact of two determinants of VC. The effect of the rigidities on
the impact of the stock of knowledge (SBRD) and of the GDP growth rate decrease with
an increase of labour market rigidities. They become negative over a threshold of 10
and 16 respectively.
Table 5 summarizes the main findings of our empirical investigation and
compares them with the results obtained by Jeng and Wells (2000) and Gompers and
Lerner (1998). The cyclicality of VC with respect to GDP growth confirms both our
expectation and the results of Gompers and Lerner (1998). Jeng and Wells (2000) did
not find any significant effect partly because of the structure of their dataset (cross
section of countries) and partly because of the use of the IPO variable.
Concerning the cost of capital, we confirm the positive impact of the short-term
interest rate obtained by Gompers and Lerner (1998) at the aggregate level. We also
show that the difference between the long-term interest rate and the short-term interest
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Estimated impact of GDP 
growth, left-hand scale
Estimated impact of R&D 
capital stock, right-hand 
Note: Estimated impact of the growth rate of GDP and the stock of knowledge on VC intensity,
according to the level of labour market rigidities. See table 4, columns 5 and 6.
Labour market rigidities reduce the intensity of VC. On the other hand, a strong
entrepreneurial culture and more intense technological opportunities and research
efforts improve the positive effect of the stock of knowledge on the VC intensity.
5 Concluding remarks
This paper aims at contributing to the literature on the determinants of VC. Our
contribution consists in (1) developing a theoretical model that takes into account the
supply-side and demand-side variables to explain VC intensity; and (2) introducing
simultaneously traditional determinants of VC and new potential determinants like the
cost of capital, the level of entrepreneurship, and novel proxies aiming at measuring
technological opportunity. The empirical results can be summarized as follows.
Interest rates have a significant impact on VC intensity. Whereas short-term and
long-term interest rates influence positively the relative level of VC via a strong23
demand-side effect, the difference between long-term and short-term interest rates has
the opposite impact, via a stronger supply-side effect.
VC is pro-cyclical. It follows a similar evolution than GDP growth rate. In periods
of high growth, the flow of venture capital outperforms the GDP growth rate, and vice
versa. This cyclicality is reduced by the degree of labour market rigidities. A high level
of labour market rigidity reduces the positive impact of GDP growth on VC intensity, as
well as the positive impact of the knowledge capital stock on VC.
We also show that indicators of technological opportunity, such as the growth rate
of R&D investment, the available stock of knowledge and the number of high value
patents (triadic patents), influence significantly a country’s investment in VC. The
positive impact of the stock of knowledge is strongly reinforced in the countries were
the rate of entrepreneurship is very high.
One important policy implication that emerges from these results is that in order
to stimulate VC in a country, demand-side factors have to be taken into account. The
most important factors affecting the demand of VC are the stock of knowledge,
innovative outputs, and interest rates. In addition, labour market rigidities and the level
of entrepreneurship do play an important role. Changing these factors would require
adjustment in structural policies (labour market and education), whose impact can only
appear in the long term.
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APPENDIX: Calculation of the variables
Business R&D capital stocks
R&D capital stocks are calculated following the perpetual inventory method. The stock
at time  t is equal to the new investment at time t plus the stock at time t-1 minus
depreciation:
1 ) 1 ( − − + = t t t SR r SR δ (A1.1)




1 + − + − + − + = − − − t t t t t r r r r SR δ δ δ
(A1.2)
To construct the initial stock we assume a constant annual rate of growth of the past
investments,
... ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 (
3 3 2 2 + − + − + − + = t t t t t r r r r SR λ δ λ δ λ δ (A1.3)






here  t SR = R&D capital stock at time t.
t r = R&D investment at time t.







and is the mean annual rate of growth of  t r  .
This formula has been used to calculate the Business R&D Capital Stock (SBRD).27
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